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Decision Theory Can Explain Why Buying and
Selling Prices Are Diﬀerent
Laxman Bokati and Vladik Kreinovich
Abstract
According to a naive understanding of economic behavior, for each
object, we should have an internal estimate of how much this object is
worth for us. If anyone oﬀers us to buy this object at a smaller amount, we
should agree, and if anyone oﬀers to buy it from us for a larger amount, we
should agree as well. In practice, however, contrary to this understanding,
the price for which we are willing to buy and the price at which we are willing to sell are often diﬀerent. In this paper, we show that this seemingly
counterintuitive phenomenon can be explained within decision theory – if
we use the standard Hurwicz optimism-pessimism recommendations for
decision making under uncertainty.
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Buying and Selling Prices Are Diﬀerent: a
Phenomenon and Its Current Quantitative Explanations

Buying and selling prices are diﬀerent: a phenomenon. According to
the naive understanding of economic behavior, we should decide, for ourselves,
how much each object is worth to us. This worth amount should be the largest
amount that we should be willing to pay if we are buying this object, and this
same amount should be the smallest amount for which we should agree to sell
this objects.
However, in many experiments, the price participants are willing to pay to
buy a certain item is diﬀerent from the price they are willing to accept to part
with this item. For example, students are willing to pay $3 for a mug but
require to be paid at least $7 to sell it back. In other words, people estimate the
consequences of losing an object diﬀerently than the consequences of gaining
the same object; see, e.g., [5, 8] and references therein.
Current explanations of this phenomenon. The current explanation of
this phenomenon is based on the fact that people are not clear on the value of
each object. Instead of the exact monetary amount, at best, they have a range
[u, u] of possible values of this object’s worth; see, e.g., [2, 3].
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Need for a more detailed analysis. While [2, 3] provide a qualitative explanation for the loss aversion phenomenon, it is desirable to extend this to a
quantitative analysis, an analysis that takes into account known results about
rational decision making under interval uncertainty. This is what we do in this
paper.
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Qualitative Explanation

Decision making under interval uncertainty: a brief reminder. How
can we make decision if, instead of the exact value of an object, we only know
the interval [u, u] of possible values? In other words, what is the value u(u, u)
that we are willing to pay for this object?
Clearly, since we know that the object is worth at least u and at most u,
this means that the price u(u, u) that we are willing to pay should also be at
least u and at most u:
u ≤ u(u, u) ≤ u.
(1)
This property is known as boundedness.
Another reasonable requirement is that if we have two diﬀerent objects, with
values in [u, u] and [v, v], then the price that we are willing to pay to buy both
should be equal to the prices that we pay for each of them. Let us describe this
second requirement in precise terms.
When we get two objects together, the smallest possible value of our purchase
is when both objects are worth their smallest amounts u and v. In this case, the
overall worth of both objects is equal to the sum u + v. Similarly, the largest
possible value of our purchase is when both objects are worth their largest
amounts u and v. In this case, the overall worth of both objects is equal to the
sum u + v. Thus, for two objects sold together the interval of possible worth
values is [u + v, u, u + v]. So, the second requirement takes the following form:
u(u + v, u + v) = u(u, u) + u(v, v).

(2)

This property is known as additivity.
It turns out (see, e.g., [6]) that the only functions that satisfy both requirements (1) and (2) are functions of the type
u(u, u) = α · u + (1 − α) · u,

(3)

for some α ∈ [0, 1]. This fact easily follows from the fact that all bounded
additive functions are linear; see, e.g., [1].
The formula (3) was ﬁrst proposed by a future Nobelist Leo Hurwicz and is
thus known as Hurwicz optimism-pessimism criterion [4, 7]. The relation with
optimism and pessimism is straightforward:
• when α = 1, the person pays the highest possible price u – which makes
sense if this person believes that the best possible scenario will take place;
this is exactly what we usually mean by extreme optimism;
2

• on the other hand, when α = 0, the person is only willing to pay the
lowest possible price u – which makes sense if this person does not believe
in the possibility of higher worth values; this is exactly what we usually
mean by extreme pessimism.
Hurwicz criterion explains the diﬀerence between buy and sell prices.
When we buy an object whose worth is between u and u, the best possible gain
is u and the worst possible gain is u. Thus, according to the Hurwicz criterion,
we should be willing to pay the amount ub (b for buy) which is equal to
ub = α · u + (1 − α) · u.

(4)

On the other hand, if we already own this object and we sell it, then our
loss is between −u and −u. The most optimistic estimate for our resulting state
is −u and the most pessimistic estimate is −u. In this case, according to the
Hurwicz criterion, this is equivalent to the value of
α · (−u) + (1 − α) · (−u).

(5)

Thus, to compensate for this loss, we need to get the amount us (s for sell) that,
when added to the value (5), will result in 0, i.e., the value
us = α · u + (1 − α) · u.

(6)

We can see that, in general, the expressions for the buy ub and sell us prices
are diﬀerent. Indeed, the only time when the prices are equal, i.e., when ub = us ,
is when
α · u + (1 − α) · u = α · u + (1 − α) · u.
Moving all the terms to the left-hand side and adding resulting coeﬃcients at u
and u, we conclude that
(2α − 1) · u − (2α − 1) · u = 0,
i.e., (2α − 1) · (u − u) = 0. Since we consider the case when we have uncertainty,
i.e., when u ̸= u, we thus conclude that 2α − 1 = 0, i.e., that α = 0.5.
So, only people with α = 0.5 buy and sell at exactly the same price. For
everyone else – who is even slightly more optimistic or even slightly less optimistic than α = 0.5 – the buy and sell prices are diﬀerent, and this is exactly
what we observe.
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